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An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a
Twenty-First Century World
Cass R. Sunstein*
In the United States, the President is controlled by the
Constitution, and in all respects subordinate to it. Insofar
as it deals with presidential power, however, the American
Constitution has proved to be a highly malleable document.
With very few exceptions,' the constitutional provisions relating to the President have not been changed at all since
they were ratified in 1787. But in the late twentieth century, those provisions do not mean what they meant in
1787. The Constitution is a legal document, and it is enforced judicially; but its meaning was hardly fixed when it
was ratified. In particular, the contemporary President has
far broader powers than the original Constitution contemplated. It is remarkable but true that large-scale changes in
the authority of the President have been brought about
without changes in the constitutional text, but nevertheless
without significant illegality.
This is a paradox. Is it not clear that constitutional
changes, if not textual, are illegal? The paradox has considerable relevance to our current thinking about the presidency in particular and about constitutionalism in general.
Perhaps the framers of the American Constitution feared
legislative power most of all;2 but from well-known events
in the twentieth century, it is possible to conclude that it is
presidential power that holds out the greatest risks to both
liberty and democracy. The President is by far the most visible leader in the nation; he is often the only person in government with a national constituency. Moreover, he is
*
Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law
School and Department of Political Science.
1. The major exceptions have to do with how the President is elected and with
the diminished authority of the Electoral College. These provisions are closely connected with some of the changes discussed below, because greater democratic legitimacy helps account for greater authority.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
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typically in charge of the armed forces, and his distinctive
visibility can lead to a kind of "cult" that threatens constitutionalism and legality itself. On the other hand, a strong
President has a distinctive democratic pedigree, and he is in
a unique position to accomplish enormous good. An understanding of this fact has spurred large-scale changes in
our conception of the presidency, especially in the New
Deal period.3
There is some dispute about whether the task of producing a strong President without endangering liberty has
been successfully accomplished in the United States. Some
people think that the American President is much too powerful; 4 others think that America has a weak president who
is circumscribed by congressional "micromanagement" and
unable to accomplish the tasks for which he is elected.
This debate raises complex questions that I cannot discuss
here. My purpose here is far narrower. I intend to show
how the modern presidency is quite different from the founders' presidency, and then to make some observations
about how all this has come about.
I do not contend that the enormous changes in the nature of the presidency are illegitimate. In fact my purposes
are mostly descriptive. But I do think that for those committed to the project of constitutionalism, it is important to
maintain a degree of continuity between the twenty-first
century president and that of the late eighteenth-century. I
offer a few notations on that surprisingly difficult project.
A general proviso: I will be covering a fair amount of
territory in a short space, and most of the issues will not
receive the detailed attention they deserve. My hope is that
a brief and broad-gauged approach will provide a vivid picture of the changes that have occurred, and of how those
changes might be defended.
This essay is in three parts. Part I briefly describes
some of the contrasts between the president of the late
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421 (1987).
4. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
5. See TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE
STRONG PRESIDENCY (1992).
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twentieth century and the president of the late eighteenth
century. Part II outlines theories of constitutional change
in the particular context of the expanded presidency. Part
III offers some conclusions.
I. THE PRESIDENT, THEN AND NOW
A. In General
It cannot be disputed that the original understanding
of the presidency called for much less presidential authority
than is taken for granted today. 6 To be sure the prominent
founder Alexander Hamilton, sought a powerful presidency. 7 Moreover, the new Constitution created an executive where the Articles of Confederation did not; the
creation of a novel executive branch was one of the most
important innovations in the Constitution. But the original
American President was exceptionally weak by contemporary standards.
In domestic affairs, the President had relatively little
law-making or even law-executing power, in part because of
the limited authority of the national government, in part
because of the general understanding that the President
would have relatively little discretion in the lawmaking process or in law-implementation. In international affairs, the
President's power was much narrower than it is now-in
part because of the limited role of the United States in the
world, in part because the President's principal unilateral
power was to repel sudden attacks on the United States.
It seems sensible to speculate that the increases in
presidential authority have come in part because of the
greater democratic legitimacy of the President given by national elections and by constant media focus on the President's plans and proposals. Nothing of this kind could havb
been anticipated at the time of the founding. This was true
in part because of the filtering effect of the Electoral College, which has withered since the founding period. To say
the least, George Washington was a visible person. But the
6. See THEODORE Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER
PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985).
7. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 70, 71, 72 (Alexander Hamilton).
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enormously high visibility of the President has helped to
create a massively different institution from what was
anticipated.
B. Particulars
We can put constitutional changes in the power of the
President in several categories. First, some changes offend
no constitutional provision, but involve alterations from
what the framers had expected or had hoped to achieve.
Second, some changes do not clearly offend the constitutional text, but do violate the framers' understanding of
what the text meant. Third, some changes offend the constitutional text. I will try to distinguish among these different kinds of changes below.
Consider the following particulars, showing the contrast between the eighteenth and twentieth-century American presidencies.
1. In the founding period, the President was supposed
to have sharply limited authority in domestic affairs, partly
because the federal government as a whole had sharply limited authority in the domestic arena. Basic regulation of
the economy was to come from state government, and especially from state courts, which elaborated upon the common
law of tort, contract, and property.8 To be sure, the President did have authority to make rules in some important
areas. 9 But by modern standards, this authority was quite
narrow. It did not involve much control over the domestic
economy. 10
By contrast, the modern President is a principal national lawmaker. The content of federal law has a great
deal to do with the President's program and agenda. Much
of this shift has occurred simply because of an unanticipated shift in power from the states to the federal government. The decline of limits on the power of the national
8.

See Lowi, supra note 6; STEPHEN R. SKOWONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERI-

CAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-

1920 (1982).
9. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
TREATISE (3d ed. 1994).
10.

RICHARD

J. PIERCE,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

See LowI, supra note 6.
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government has helped to increase the authority of the
President.1 In implementing national law, the executive
branch, therefore, issues an extraordinary range of regulations affecting the national economy.
It is a simple truth that the national government has far
more authority than the framers of the Constitution originally envisaged. It is equally if less simply true that as an
inevitable result of this shift, the President himself has assumed an array of duties and powers not within the contemplation of the Constitution's authors.
The President's assumption of these powers is not in
violation of the constitutional text (except to the extent that
the current authority of the national government is itself
unconstitutional). But there is no doubt that presidential
powers are, along this dimension, quite different from what
was anticipated.
2. In issuing regulations and indeed in all of his official
acts, the President needs congressional (or constitutional)
authorization. He cannot exceed any limits that Congress
has laid down. 12 He must "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully Executed.' 1 3 But often Congress offers very
vague guidance. The President has a great deal of discretion. Perhaps this discretion violates the Constitution, as a
violation of the grant of legislative power to Congress. 4
Perhaps this is an impermissible delegation of legislative
authority. But the twentieth century has witnessed a judicial refusal to enforce the nondelegation doctrine,' 5 which
required clear standards from the legislature. The downfall
of the nondelegation doctrine has meant that the President
can exercise tremendous policymaking discretion in the domestic sphere. This sphere includes regulation of the environment, energy, occupational safety and health,
communications, and much else besides.
I do not suggest that the nondelegation doctrine was a
clear constitutional imperative in the founding period, or
11. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1991).
i2. See Youngstown Sheet & Tbbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1959).
-13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
15. See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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that in the original understanding, Congress was banned
from granting broad discretion to the President.16 It is frequently observed, and lamented, that the nondelegation
doctrine has not been used to invalidate a federal statute
since 1935.17 It is less frequently observed, but no less important, that the doctrine was not used to invalidate a federal statute until that same year. The nondelegation
doctrine enjoyed only one good year-a point that complicates the view that broad grants of policymaking authority
are in violation of the original design.
There can be no doubt, however, that the post-New
Deal grant of discretionary authority to the President has
altered the President's original constitutional role and
greatly expanded his authority over the domestic sphere.
We might be skeptical of the idea that courts should invalidate the grant of discretionary authority to the President, 8
while also agreeing that such grants give the President what
is, in effect, legislative, or at least discretionary, power far
beyond what was contemplated by the original
Constitution.
3. The framers of the Constitution probably wanted to
allow Congress to limit the President's authority over the
many high-level officials who implement the laws enacted
by Congress.1 9 If Congress saw fit, it probably had the constitutional authority to insulate some high-level officials
from presidential supervision or discharge. This principle
might seem to be a dry and technical matter, but it has
enormous importance. If the Secretary of the Treasury can
be controlled by the Congress, but not by the President, the
allocation of national powers is much changed.
It is now generally agreed, however, that the President
has broad power over almost all high-level officials who im16.

See

KENNETH CULP DAVIS

&

RICHARD

J.

PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

TREATISE (3d ed. 1994).

17.

See

THEODORE

J.

Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC

OF THE UNITED STATES (1979).

18. See Mistretta v. United States, 448 U.S. 361 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. This controversial claim is defended in Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Preside:,t and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). A response can be found in Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
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plement the law. 20 To be sure, Congress has the constitutional authority to create "independent" agencies. 21 It is
unclear, however, how "independent" the independent
agencies really are, as a matter of law or practice. The
Supreme Court has never told us, and in practice, the independent agencies are not so independent of the President.22 In any case, the heads of the Cabinet, and of most
executive agencies, can be discharged by the President
whenever the President chooses. In practice, this means
that the President has enormous authority to control their
activities.
Moreover, Congress has no power to discharge administrative officials on its own and little power to prevent the
President from acting however he wishes. (Of course both
the President and all implementing officials must obey the
instructions laid down by Congress.) The result is that most
administration of the laws-an extremely large and important category-is subject to the will of the President. When
the President changes, the administration changes as well,
at least as a matter of technical law and largely, too, as a
matter of practice.
An especially interesting illustration of this phenomenon is the new process of White House supervision of
agency rulemaking. This process received its most striking
23
endorsement during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
24
President Clinton has made a similar claim of authority.
In fact, President Clinton has gone somewhat farther than
President Reagan, and in two different ways. First, he has
asserted at least a measure of control over the so-called independent agencies; second, he has apparently claimed the
authority to block regulations. At least as a technical matter, the process of White House supervision means that the
20.
21.
22.
23.
(1988);
(1988).
24.
(1993).

The key decision is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 19.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601
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President will have firm control over the rulemaking
process.
The assumption of broad presidential power over the
executive agencies is not itself unconstitutional. That
power is probably contemplated by Congress itself when it
delegates authority to an executive agency, and there is
nothing troublesome about presidential control of agents
whom Congress has subjected to presidential control. But
our current understanding of the constitutional landscape is
not the founding understanding. Existing limits on Congress' power to structure what we call "the executive
branch"--7however indistinct they may appear in hard
cases-are far more severe than the limits at the founding
period.
4. It is generally understood that the President will
submit to Congress both (a) a proposed budget and (b) a
great deal of proposed legislation. As a result, the President now has a formidable role in the enactment of national
legislation. The Constitution contains no explicit provision
on the budget, and it does not clearly sort out the President's role with respect to congressional consideration of
legislation. To be sure, the Constitution does grant the
President the power to "recommend to [Congress'] consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. '26 But it was not originally believed that the
President would submit a budget to Congress, or that he
would have a great deal of authority over the expenditure
of national funds; nor was it understood that the President
would play a dominant role in the national legislative
process.
Indeed, it is unclear exactly how much authority the
President was supposed to have over the initiation of legislation. Despite the Constitution's provision on this point,
President Washington suggested that " '[m]otives of delicacy ... have uniformly restrained the P[resident] from introducing any topick [sic] which relates to Legislative
matters to members of either house of Congress, lest it
25. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 19.
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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should be suspected that he wished to influence the question before it.' "27 Hence, Washington "would not permit
congressional committees to solicit his opinion, but intiwillingness to express his views, when asked, to a
mated his
28
friend.
Washington's own approach does seem extreme; as I
have noted, the Constitution itself authorizes a broader
role.29 But in the founding period, it was hardly believed
that the President would have the current powers of initiative, granting him considerable power over the content of
national law. The President's modern power of initiative,
with respect to the budget and lawmaking, is quite fundamental to the nature of our government. Of course, much
legislation is initiated by people other than the President.
But it is plausible to think that no one has as much authority as the President himself. This is not a violation of the
Constitution. It is, however, a wholly unanticipated increase in presidential power.
5. The President's power to veto legislation has turned
out to allow him a surprisingly large role in determining the
content of national legislation. The founders of the Constitution deliberately and explicitly gave the President the
veto power. 30 But they did not contemplate its current importance, and they might well have been alarmed if they
had been forewarned.
In granting the President the power to veto legislation,
the framers' principal goal was to allow the President to
veto laws on constitutional, rather than policy, grounds.3'
Their special goal was to permit him to prevent Congress
from intruding on the President's constitutional powers.
This goal was narrow indeed. The framers did not anticipate a situation in which the power to veto would entail a
significant role over the development of policy in lawmaking. It is not entirely clear that the framers sought to allow
27. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS:
HISTORY 55 (1948)(quoting George Washington,
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 493 (John C.

A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
Letter (Feb. 1792), in 31 THE
Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-44)).

28. Id.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
3.
30. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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the President to veto legislation solely on the ground that
he disagreed with the policy judgments embodied in it
(though probably the best reading of the history is that the
founders believed that the President could veto legislation
on policy grounds 32). But they thought that this power
would be exercised rarely and only in the most extreme
cases.
The founders certainly did not anticipate the current
situation, in which the veto power is a well-understood part
of all lawmaking, and implies a large and continuous presidential role in lawmaking itself. In short: the President's
legal and political authority is greatly augmented by Congress' knowledge that the President can veto legislation of
which he disapproves. The deterrent effect of the veto
should not be understated. The current veto power is probably best viewed as constitutionally acceptable, but as nonetheless producing a situation that the founders did not
expect and would not have welcomed.
6. With the emergence of the United States as a world
power, the President's foreign affairs authority has become
far more capacious than was originally anticipated. For the
most part this is because the powers originally conferred on
the President have turned out-in light of the unanticipated
position of the United States in the world-to mean much
more than anyone would have thought. The constitutionally granted authorities have led to a great deal of unilateral
authority, simply because the United States is so central an
actor on the world scene. The posture of the President
means a great deal even if the President acts clearly within
the scope of his constitutionally-granted power. Indeed,
mere words from the President, at a press conference or
during an interview, can have enormous consequences for
the international community.
In addition, however, the President has been permitted
to initiate military activity in circumstances in which the
original understanding would have required congressional
authorization. On the founding view, a congressional dec-

32.

See THE

FEDERALIST

No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
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laration of war was a precondition for war.33 The only exception was that the President could act on his own in order
to repel a sudden attack on the United States.34 But in the
twentieth century, a large amount of presidential warmakbeen allowed without congressional declaration of
ing has
35
war.

We should distinguish among three categories here.
First, some of these exercises of authority may have been
unconstitutional. Some of them may have required a congressional declaration as a precondition for national action.
Second, some may have been permissible because they involved military action short of "war." Third, some may
have been permissible because the category of "sudden attack" must be understood capaciously under current conditions. I cannot desegregate these various possibilities here.
Instead I offer a simple point: in any of these cases, the
President's power goes far beyond what was expected.
II. INTERPRETATION, AMENDMENT, OTHERS
From all these points we might reaffirm the old truism
that the Constitution-at least in the area of presidential
authority-is no mere lawyer's document. The original understanding has not controlled the future. The Constitution's meaning is not fixed. It is in large part a function of
historical practices and needs, and of shared understandings
over time.36 Often the power of the President is understood
to be quite different from what it was, say, twenty-five years
earlier.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the President's constitutional power is simply a matter of what
seems to him appropriate or necessary, and not a matter of
law at all. Often the President loses in the Supreme Court,
and in nearly every important case, he has graciously accepted his defeat. To take just a few examples from the
twentieth century: President Nixon was forced to hand over
33.

See

34.

Id.

GEOFFREY

R.

STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(2d ed. 1991).

35. Id.
36. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).

HeinOnline -- 48 Ark. L. Rev. 11 1995

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

his own tape-recorded conversations during the Watergate
controversy; President Truman was prevented from seizing
the steel mills during the Korean War; President Eisenhower was banned from stopping communists from travelling abroad.37 These defeats are important in themselves,
but they are even more important for the general tone that
they set. Every American President knows that his actions
are subject to judicial review, and this is a large deterrent to
illegal conduct.
For purposes of judicial review, the President's most
important constitutional duty is "to Take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed. ' 38 This provision subordinates
the President to the law. It also requires him to adhere to
the law, both constitutional and statutory.
I have suggested that the changing understandings of
the President's power have occurred without either textual
change or flagrant presidential violations of constitutional
requirements. I have also suggested that this presents a
genuine paradox. We have a president who is much
stronger than the framers of the Constitution anticipated;
but, at least in general, the current presidency is not
thought, and should not be thought, unconstitutional. How,
then, have the President's powers changed? There are several possibilities.
A.

Flexible Provisions and Silences

Many of the changes have occurred because the relevant constitutional provisions are both spare and ambiguous, and they allow adaptation to changing circumstances.
For example, the grant of "executive power" to the President leaves much uncertainty. To many modern readers,
the term connotes all or much law-implementation. 39 It
may have carried a narrower meaning in the founding period. Or consider the authority of the President in the area
of foreign affairs. The relevant provisions are highly ambig37. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1959); Kent v. Duiles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
38. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 3.
39. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
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uous, certainly on their face. It is hardly crystal clear what
powers accompany the authority to be "Commander-inChief of the armed forces."
The Constitution also contains important silences. The
Constitution does not say whether the veto power comprehends policy disagreements. It does not describe the precise relation between the President and the administration.
It does not discuss whether the President may submit a
budget. Constitutional change has occurred in part because
of constitutional ambiguities and silences. It seems obvious
that a constitution that is not rigid, and that leaves gaps and
uncertainties, will allow for adaptation without amendment
or illegality.
B.

Emergencies

Many constitutions contain emergency provisions, allowing the government to have special powers under conditions of emergency. Most notably, the American
Constitution contains no emergency provisions (although
the President is allowed to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus during war 0 ). It might seem natural to think that in
spite of the absence of explicit emergency powers, many increases in presidential authority have occurred as a result of
emergencies. Certainly it is true that some such increases
occurred in the New Deal period, as a result of what some
people believed to be the emergency conditions of the
Great Depression. And some of the most dramatic exercises or vindications of presidential authority involved what
many thought to involve emergency. 4'
In general, however, changing powers of the presidency are not a product of emergencies. It would be a mistake to think that authorities have been conferred on the
President because of an implicit "emergency provision" allowing American officials to do what is necessary in dire
circumstances. Indeed, the President has rarely been found
to have special authority to act during emergencies. A domestic crisis-widespread unemployment, social unrest40.
41.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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does not give the President any new power.42 There is no
judicial understanding that the President has greater authority if he can point to an emergency situation, or claim
that unusual presidential action is crucial.
Of course Congress might well decide to confer statutory authority on the President in order to enable him to
respond to a crisis. Of course Congress has made this decision in emergencies. In the New Deal period, for example,
Congress gave the President a range of new authorities because of the perceived need for special responses to the
Great Depression. But the President has not been allowed
to act on his own. An emergency does not give the President any unilateral powers.
C. Common Law Constitutionalism
Some academic observers43 believe that in the United
States, interpretation of the Constitution depends less on
constitutional text and history and more on particular, casespecific judicial decisions. This process of case-by-case development allows the meaning of the document to change
over time. Indeed, constitutional law in America (and in
many other nations as well) has many features of the common law process. In that process, no one sets down broad
legal rules in advance. The meaning of the Constitution is
not a product of antecedent rules. Instead, the rules
emerge narrowly as judges decide individual cases. Governing principles come from the process of case-by-case adjudication, and sometimes they Cannot be known in
advance. It does seem clear that much of constitutional law
in the United States comes not from the constitutional text
itself, but from judge-made constitutional law, interpreting
constitutional provisions. For this reason, the meaning of
the document is not rigidly fixed when the document is
written and ratified.
42. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
43. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation (August 1, 1994)(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University
of Chicago Law School).
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Something of this kind is certainly true for the powers
of the President, and the system of common law constitutionalism helps explain the shifting understandings of presidential power. Consider, for example, the complex
question whether Congress or the President may discharge
high-level public officials (the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior). The text of the
Constitution does not speak clearly on this issue; instead,
the governing constitutional principles have been worked
out in the process of case-by-case adjudication. In Myers v.
United States,44 the Court said that high-level executive officers must be subject to the plenary control of the President. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,45 the Court
qualified this rule, saying that officials exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-executive functions may be immunized
from the President. In Bowsher v. Synar,46 the Court distinguished between a congressional role in removal of law-implementing officials, which would be impermissible, and
independence, which would be acceptable. And in Morrison v. Olson,4 7 the Court said that purely executive officers
may sometimes be made independent of the President.
This elaborate body of doctrine, reflecting changing understandings over time, is a classic illustration of how the process of case-by-case adjudication, unburdened by general
rules given in advance, can allow presidential authority to
shift.
It might be added that a good deal of presidential authority turns not on judicial decisions at all, but on traditional practices and shared understandings between the
President and Congress. Common law constitutionalism
occurs outside the judiciary. The development of these
practices and understandings resembles the process of common law development. It is recognized that a certain practice "works"; Congress and the President endorse the
practice; and the practice therefore operates as a guide for
the future. Of course no such practices should be permitted
44. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
45. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
46. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
47. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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to violate the Constitution where that document speaks
with clarity.
D. Translation
Some people, most notably Lawrence Lessig, 48 have argued that when circumstances have changed, the Supreme
Court must "translate" the original constitutional text or
history in order to adapt it to the new conditions. Suppose,
for example, that the founders of the Constitution originally
sought to allow the President to make war on his own only
for defensive purposes-to repel sudden attacks on the
United States. Suppose, too, that in modern conditions,
threats to Canada and Mexico are extremely threatening to
the United States because of the strategic importance of
these nations to the American capacity for self-defense. Or
suppose (as many people believe) that under current conditions, the line between "offensive" and "defensive" use of
the military becomes extremely thin. New circumstances
have made that original line far more ambiguous than it
was at the founding.
Consider another example. 49 Perhaps the original document gave the President less than complete authority over
those who administer the laws. Perhaps the founders believed that Congress could insulate some administration
from the President, on the theory that insulated administration would not, under the assumptions of the founding period, endanger any important constitutional commitments.
It may be that insulated administration does endanger important constitutional commitments once the founding assumptions have been altered. Now that administration of
the laws involves large-scale domestic policymaking, it may
be intolerable-from the perspective of original constitu-

tional commitments-to allow administrators to operate independently of the President, at least outside of certain
confined areas. To maintain fidelity to constitutional com-

48. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993);
Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity in Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming March 1995).
49. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 19.
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mitments, we must understand the document to give the
President power that he did not have at the founding.
If this is true, perhaps it is generally true that original
constitutional provisions, translated into a new context, give
the President new and broader authority. If, to return to
the first example, we want to adhere to the original constitutional goal-to allow the President to act unilaterally
when necessary-perhaps the President may act unilaterally not simply to repel sudden attacks on the United
States, but in any case in which American interests are at
serious risk. Perhaps this view accounts for many of the
changes I have described.
The "translation" argument raises many complexities.
The notion of "translation" is no more than a metaphor,
and the task of interpreting a provision in new circumstances is hardly identical to the task of rendering words in
another language. There are considerable complexities in
deciding what it is that is being translated. What is being
translated is not a brute fact, but itself the product of interpretation, in the form of a constructive account of some
sort, one that has important evaluation dimensions. But the
general idea of translation has appeared in several Supreme
Court opinions as a way of making sense of the practice of
interpretation in changed circumstances.5 0 In many ways
the metaphor is useful.
E. Several Constitutional Regimes?
Some people, most notably Bruce Ackerman, think
America has had more than one constitutional regimethat at crucial moments in our history, the people have inaugurated large-scale changes in the Constitution.5 1 The
Civil War, for example, is said to have inaugurated a Second American Republic, with new understandings of the allocation of power between the nation and the states, and
with new understandings of the allocation of power between the nation and the states, and with new understand50. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
51. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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ings of individual rights. Some people think that President
Roosevelt's New Deal-responding to the Great Depression-also produced constitutional change. In his influen52 Ackerman argues
tial book, We the People: Foundations,
that the United States has had three constitutional regimes,
not simply one. In Ackerman's view, the New Deal was a
constitutional moment, inaugurating a new constitutional
regime.
If America has had more than one constitutional regime, we might think about presidential power in a somewhat different way. During the Civil War period, the
presidency became somewhat different from what it had
been before.5 3 In the New Deal period, there were additional changes, many of them discussed above. The national government appeared to acquire significant new
constitutional authority. The President was a principal beneficiary of this shift, especially insofar as the Supreme
Court refused to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, which,
as noted, required any legislative delegations of power to
the executive to be narrow and clear. Some people therefore conclude that the New Deal effectively amended the
Constitution, giving the President a range of new powers.
There can be no doubt that after the New Deal, the
Constitution meant something different from what it had
meant previously. There can be no doubt that changing understandings of presidential power were an important part
of this change. We may doubt, however, whether the notion of constitutional amendment is the most helpful way to
conceive of things. In the United States, we identify the
constitution with a written text. It is customarily thought
that Constitutional amendments cannot occur without
changes in constitutional text. The absence of a textual
change seems devastating to the view that the New Deal
amended the Constitution. To say that an unwritten change
qualifies as a constitutional amendment does too much violence to our common understandings of what a Constitution is.
52. 1 id.
53. lid.
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On the other hand, it is right to point to the creative
features of the New Deal period, and also to insist that our
conception of constitutional meaning was different after
Roosevelt from what it had been before. We can fruitfully
think of the New Deal developments-if they are to be legitimated-as an effort to maintain fidelity with constitutional commitments through new interpretations as a result
of changes over time. The commerce power, for example,
plausibly means something quite different in the context of
a highly interdependent economy from what it means in a
period in which interstate consequences are far less likely.
Permissible delegations of legislative power to the President may also shift when rapid changes in national policy
became more necessary in light of the extent of national
regulatory power and the need to keep up with changing
developments of fact and policy.54 Moreover, we can take
the Supreme Court's new constitutional interpretations
post-New Deal as precedents, establishing the legitimacy of
the New Deal entitled to a high degree of respect from subsequent generations.
Discussions of "constitutional amendment" are helpful
insofar as they draw attention to the creative aspects of the
New Deal shift. But the notion of amendment seems too
exotic and adventurous when more modest explanations do
equally good explanatory work.
III.

Conclusions

In this essay, I have outlined some aspects of the extraordinary changes in the constitutional power of the President. I have also offered some diverse explanations of the
changing nature of that constitutional power. There is no
question that the current President is quite different from
the founders' President. In some ways, it is hard for those
committed to the project of constitutionalism to explain the
discontinuities, which complicate the idea that the written
constitution has a high degree of stability over time. One of
the distinguishing features of the American Constitution is
54.

See the criticisms of Ackerman in Cass R. Sunstein, New Deals,
Jan. 20, 1992, at 32.

REPUBLIC,
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its flexibility. The changed nature of the presidency is a testimonial to this fact.
What best accounts for the changes? I have suggested
that emergencies are not the source of constitutional
change, and that it is too exotic to think that the Constitution was amended by the New Deal. The most promising
explanations stress the flexibility of the original text, the
process of common law adjudication, and the need to maintain fidelity with original commitments over changed circumstances. If these are the best explanations, it seems
clear that a distinctive feature of the constitutional provisions governing the President is that they allow a large degree of adaptation over time. Moreover, it emerges that
one of the virtues of the American constitutional experience is the process of case-by-case adjudication, giving
meaning of constitutional provisions through close encounter with particular cases.
The discussion suggests some broad outlines for constitutional interpretation as well. More "offensive" presidential authority with respect to military action is probably a
good way of maintaining faith with the constitutional
framework, in light of the problematic nature of the offense-defense distinction under modern conditions. General presidential control of the administration is also
appropriate in light of the now-enormous authority of what
has become known as the executive branch. 5 It would be a
mistake to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, except,
perhaps, for extreme cases; the purposes of the doctrine
should be served through other means. 6 These general
propositions leave many particular questions, but they
might be taken to suggest some directions for the future.
What lessons can be drawn from the American experience with constitutional constraints on presidential power?
The question is of special importance not only for Americans, but for all others concerned with the nature of written
constitutions, including those in Eastern Europe and South
55. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 19, for the argument and for
qualifications.
56. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
323 (1987).
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Africa. Perhaps two lessons are of special importance. The
first involves the limited effects of constitutionaltext, at least

over time. Constitutional meaning depends in large part on
shared understandings and practices. Most of these will not
be in the Constitution itself. Although the Constitution is a
legal document, there will be a great deal of opportunity to
adapt constitutional meaning to changes in both understanding and practice over time. Words are outrun by circumstances. They may be rendered ambiguous by the sheer
passage of time. New problems will emerge, and constitutional text may well fail to solve them, or even to address
them.
A second (and somewhat conflicting) lesson involves
the importance of a culture of constitutionalism in maintain-

ing a constitutional order. Judicial review is an important,
but by no means the only, contributor to the creation of
such a culture. Without the courts, presidential illegality
would be less frequently discouraged, and less frequently
countered. But much of the relevant culture comes from
shared understandings within the executive and legislative
branches. This culture is needed to ensure against the most
egregious abuses of legal authority, from the President as
well as from others.
In America, judicial review, and the constitutional culture more broadly, have been important as a check afterthe-fact and, perhaps even more, as a before-the-fact deterrent to presidential illegality. A culture of constitutionalism
and the rule of law, spurred by judicial review, has helped
deter presidential lawlessness in cases in which the need for
action seemed great to the President, and the legal technicalities seemed like an irritating irrelevance. In such considerations, I suggest, lies the solution to a remarkable and
insufficiently analyzed paradox of American constitutionalism: a dramatically changed and strengthened presidency,
brought about without constitutional amendment and
nonetheless without significant illegalities.
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